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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal from summary judgment in a personal injury case was 
transferred to the Utah Supreme Court by the Utah Court of Appeals by Order 
dated October 19, 2001 because the Court of Appeals determined it does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2), as amended. 
(R. 200). The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under U.C.A. 78-2-2(3)0), 
as amended. (R. 200) 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether summary judgment in favor of Four Corners should be 
affirmed on legal grounds presented below in the alternative to grounds under 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A. 63-30-1, et seq., as amended, 
(hereinafter "UGIA") 
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Standard of review: Summary judgment is appropriate under URCvP 
56(c ) only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Entitlement to summary judgment is 
a question of law, and no deference is due the trial court's determination of the 
issues presented. A grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground 
available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993), Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 
827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). 
Citation to the record showing this issue was preserved in the trial court: 
Four Corners abandoned the UGIA argument at the hearing before Judge 
Halliday on June 19, 2001. (R. 206, pp. 6-7) Four Corners argued alternative 
legal theories for summary judgment. First, Smith's claims are time barred by 
the two year statute of limitations under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, 
U.C.A. 78-14-1, et seq., as amended (hereinafter "UHCMA") based upon Four 
Corners' providing services as health care provider covered by the UHCMA 
and upon Smith's failure timely to comply with the notice and prelitigation 
review requirements of the Act. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Four Corners Mental 
Health Center, Inc. dated July 27, 2000 (hereinafter "Four Corners' 
Memorandum in Support") R. 49-55; Oral Argument, R. 206, pp. 7-10, 15-21). 
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Second, based on the lack of duty to warn or protect Smith from the criminal 
assault of the third party perpetrator of the assault upon Smith (hereinafter 
"Bybee"). (Four Corners' Memorandum in Support, R. 55-57; Oral Argument, 
R. 206, pp. 10-13,15-21). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether summary judgment was proper on the grounds that 
Smith failed timely to comply with the notice and prelitigation procedures of 
the UHCMA. 
Standard of review: Whether a party is a health care provider entitled to 
the protections of the UHCMA is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Platts v Helping, 897 P.2d 1228, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Citation to the record showing this issue was preserved in the trial court: 
(Four Corners' Memorandum in Support (R. 49-55); Oral argument, R. 206, pp. 
7-13, 15-21; Four Corners' Memorandum in Reply, R. 111, 112,114-115). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether summary judgment was proper on the grounds that 
Four Corners had no legal duty to warn or protect Smith from intentional 
misconduct by a third party. 
Standard of Review: The existence of a duty is a legal question reviewed 
for correctness. Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991). 
Citation to the record showing this issue was preserved in the trial court: 
(Four Corners' Memorandum in Support, R. 49-52, 55-57; Oral argument, R. 
206, pp. 10-13, 15-21). 
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ISSUE NO. 4: Whether Smith is precluded on appeal from challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence by failing to marshal the evidence. 
Standard of review: An appellant attacking the sufficiency of the 
evidence must marshal all evidence supporting the judgment and then show that 
the evidence cannot support the support the judgment. Von Hake v. Thomas, 
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). The burden on an appellant to establish that the 
evidence does not support the judgment is quite heavy. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. 
Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). 
Citation to the record showing this issue was preserved in the trial court: 
The requirement of marshalling the evidence arises on appeal. 
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether the trial court's summary judgment entered in the face 
of Smith's unanswered discovery requests to Four Comers was clear error. 
Standard of review: Application of particular facts to the applicable legal 
standard is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's legal conclusions 
are reviewed for correctness and its factual findings for clear error. Factual 
findings are not clearly erroneous unless they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence or unless the appellate court reaches a definite and clear conclusion 
that a mistake has been made. Nunlev v. Weststates Casing Servs., 1999 UT 
100, para. 17, 989 P.2d 1077, 1083 (UT 1999). 
Citation to the record showing this issue was preserved in the trial court: 
(Four Comers' Memorandum in Support, R. 49-52; Defendant Four Comers 
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Mental Health Center, Inc.'s Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum 
in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 4, 2000 
(hereinafter "Four Corners Memorandum in Reply") R. 111-112; Oral 
Argument R.206, pp. 15-21). 
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether the Affidavit of Smith's Mother Tracy Morris (R. 
146-148) and the Want Ads (Exhibit 1 to Appellant's Brief) are admissible 
evidence and sufficient to create genuine disputes of material fact. 
Standard of review: The standard of review when considering the 
admissibility of out-of-court statements under the Utah Rules of Evidence 
depends on whether the trial court's analysis involves a factual or legal 
determination or some combination thereof. Here, the admissibility of the 
Affidavit and Want Ads are reviewed for clear error. State v. Parker, 2000 UT 
51, para. 13, 4 P.3d 778, 781 (UT 2000). 
Citation to the record showing this issue was preserved in the trial court: 
Defendant Randall's Motion to Strike portions of Tracy Morris Affidavit and 
supporting Memorandum, R. 160-164; Objection to Want Ads, Oral argument 
R.206, pp. 21-22). 
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SUPPLEMENT TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Supplemental Relevant Facts.1 
Four Corners' Memorandum in Support sets forth Undisputed Facts 
supported by the record as follows: 
" 1 . Plaintiffs Complaint dated November 24, 1998 alleges that 
Defendant Four Corners ".. .is a Utah corporation providing mental health 
care and other related services in Carbon County and Emery County." 
(Complaint, para. 3). 
2. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff Craig Curtis Smith sustained 
injury during the month of June 1993 when he was sexually assaulted by 
a James Bybee. (Complaint, para. 10, 13). 
3. The Complaint alleges that on or about January 14, 1992 the 
Seventh Judicial District Court placed Plaintiff into the custody of the 
State of Utah, Department of Human Services (hereinafter "DHS") , and 
that on that same date DHS placed Plaintiff in the home of Defendants 
Larry and Carolyn Randall who were "... persons licensed, approved, and 
controlled by DHS as foster parents" . (Complaint, paras. 7, 8) 
4. The Complaint alleges that on a date unknown DHS hired Four 
Corners to oversee the foster care provided to Plaintiff by the Randalls. 
(Complaint, para. 9) 
5. The Complaint alleges that on a date unknown DHS and Four 
corners placed James Bybee in the foster home of the Randalls, and did 
so with actual or constructive knowledge that Bybee possessed a violent 
character and had homosexual tendencies. (Complaint, paras. 10-12) 
6. Construing it broadly and in Plaintiffs favor, the Complaint 
alleges that Plaintiff notified workers at Four Corners and DHS and the 
Randalls about the attack they did not adequately discuss his complaints. 
(Complaint, para. 18) 
7. The Complaint alleges that Randalls were negligent and left 
Plaintiff and other foster children unattended and without supervision 
thus allowing the attack on Plaintiff by Bybee. (Complaint, para. 17) 
8. The complaint alleges the following as actionable fault on the part 
of Four Corners: 
Supplemental facts are needed to the extent Smith has failed to marshal the evidence. Oneida/ SLIC v. Oneida 
Cold Storage. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 872 P.2d 1051, 1053-1054 (UT App. 1994) 
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a. Failure to provide caseworker services to Plaintiff and the 
Randalls; 
b. Failing to evaluate and treat Plaintiffs injuries; 
c. Failing to determine that Randalls were unfit as foster; 
d. Placing Bybee and Plaintiff in a foster home together; 
e. Failing to advise Plaintiff and the Randalls of Bybee's 
characteristics. (Complaint, paras. 19-20) 
9. Plaintiff, his mother Traci Pettyjohn, and their attorney David M. 
Allred executed a Notice of Claim under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act directed to DHS and Four Comers dated August 12, 1994 
which provides in pertinent part: "1 . That Craig Smith (hereinafter 
Smith) is a minor child, being bom on the 14th day of January, 1980, is a 
male, and is age 14... 3. That in or about 1991, Smith was placed in the 
custody of the State of Utah. 4. That during said custodial relationship 
Smith was placed into the care of Four Comers Mental Health 
(hereinafter Four Comers) which is a political subdivision pursuant to 
17A-3-601, et seq. UCA 1953 , as amended, for the purposes of 63-30-
10, UCA 1953, as amended." (attached) 
10. The Notice of Claim provides that Smith was assaulted and raped 
by "J.B.", presumably referring to the above-mentioned James Bybee, and 
that the subject incident occurred June 1993. (para. 8). 
11. Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatory 
dated May 19, 2000 and signed under oath by the Executive Director of 
Four Comers (attached) provide describes the nature and purpose of 
Defendant's association with Plaintiff: 
"The Defendant is a corporation which renders medically necessary 
mental health treatment services and other services arising out of the 
health care needs of people utilizing Defendant's services. Defendant 
employs and contracts with licensed mental health therapists, social 
workers, physicians, nurses, psychologists, and other mental health 
professionals to provided medically necessary treatment for diagnosed 
mental health problems. Defendant provided outpatient mental health 
treatment to the plaintiff to treat plaintiffs diagnosed mental health 
problems. In addition, the defendant provided residential treatment, 
including room and board, under contract with the State of Utah. The 
defendant never had custody of plaintiff by court order or otherwise. The 
undersigned has reviewed Plaintiffs complaint which alleges that 
Plaintiff was injured in an assault which occurred due to Defendant's 
fault in June 1993. Defendant was providing mental health services 
during that period of time..." (Answer to interrogatory 15) 
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12. As set forth in the Defendants Responses to Interrogatories, prior 
to the subject incident in June 1993 Plaintiff received mental health 
services at the Child and Adolescent Residential Treatment Home; Emery 
Star Route, Price, Utah from approximately 12/91 until 5/93, and 
Defendant may have provided Plaintiff with residential CART home 
treatment services under contract with the State of Utah from 12/4/91 -
1/14/92. (Answer to interrogatory 16) 
13. As set forth in the Defendants Responses to Interrogatories, 
Plaintiffs outpatient clinical case with Defendant was opened 1/14/92 
and was still open at the time of the subject incident in June 1993. 
However, Defendant did not "place" the Plaintiff in the foster home of 
the Defendants Randall; Plaintiff was at the time in the custody of the 
State of Utah. Nor did Defendant supervise or license the Randalls as 
Foster parents. (Answer to interrogatory 16) 
14. To Defendant's knowledge, no Notice of Intent to Commence 
Action was served on Defendant pursuant to U.C.A. 78-14-8, 1979 as 
amended, and no prelitigation panel was requested or convened pursuant 
to 78-14-12, as amended." (See Four Comers Memorandum in Support, 
R. 49-52, and its exhibits: Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs First Set of 
Interrogatories dated May 19, 2000, R. 59-82; Exhibit Smith's Notice of 
Claim, unpaginated but appearing in the Record located between R. 82-
83) 
2. Four Comers' Memorandum in Reply asserted that its undisputed facts 
should be deemed admitted under URCvP 56 and UCJA 4-501 (2)(B) based on 
the supporting evidence together with the lack of admissible controverting 
evidence or appropriate objections from Smith: (Four Comers' Reply 
Memorandum, R. 111-112) 
3. The Affidavit of Tracy Morris (R. 146-148) offered by Smith as evidence 
of Four Comers' actual or constructive knowledge of Bybee's allegedly violent 
tendencies and of the existence of Four Comers' duty to protect Smith from 
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Bybee contains inadmissible hearsay and unfounded opinions in paragraphs 2, 
3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 and should have been stricken on the Randall's motion. 
4. The Want Ads (Appellant's Brief, Exhibit 1) were inadmissible hearsay 
without foundation showing authenticity and offered untimely at oral argument 
contrary to URCvP 56 (c ) and UCJA 4-501(2)(B). Four Comers' objections at 
oral argument should have been sustained. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First, Four Comers presented evidence and legal argument to Judge 
Halliday in support of summary judgment on three grounds: (1) Smith's claims 
are barred under the UGIA, (2) Smith's claims were time barred for his failure 
timely to comply with the UHCMA, and (3) Four Comers did not owe Smith a 
duty under the circumstances to warn him against or protect him from an assault 
by a third party. Four Comers abandoned the UGIA and summary judgment 
should be affirmed under the both remaining additional grounds presented 
below. 
Second, summary judgment was proper for Smilh's non-compliance with 
the UHCMA. Even construing Smith's notice of claim as a notice of intent to 
commence action under U.C.A. 78-14-8, no prelitigation panel review was ever 
requested under U.C.A. 78-14-12(2) and such proceedings are compulsory as a 
condition precedent to litigation under U.C.A. 78-14-12 (l)(c), as amended. 
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Accordingly, Smith's claims against Four Comers are time barred by the two 
year statute of limitations of U.C.A. 78-14-4(1) and (2) notwithstanding his 
minority. 
Third, summary judgment was proper for lack of duty on the part of Four 
Comers to protect Smith or warn him of the risk of harm by a third party. The 
undisputed facts are insufficient to show a "special relationship" within the 
meaning of Rst. 2d Torts, sec. 315 giving rise to a duty on the part of Four 
Comers Mental Health to control Bybee. Further, the undisputed facts are 
insufficient to show that therapists at Four Comers Mental Health had a duty to 
immunity defenses which Four Comers had waived was harmless error. 
Fourth, Appellants' brief does not attempt to marshal the evidence . 
Fifth, Smith did not bring a motion to compel, a motion under URCvP 
56(f) to continue the hearing to allow additional discovery by Smith, or other 
motion to test the appropriateness of the objections by Four Comers to his 
discovery requests, or to allow additional discovery necessary to respond to the 
motion. Smith's assignment of error based on Four Comers' objections and 
refusal to respond to interrogatories was not properly preserved below. 
Sixth, the Affidavit of Tracy Morris contains inadmissible hearsay and 
unfounded opinions. The Want Ads (exhibit 2 to Appellant's brief) are 
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inadmissible and are not part of the record and Smith should not be permitted to 
add evidence to the record on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Point one: Summary judgment for Appellee Four Corners should be affirmed on 
legal grounds properly raised and supported by evidence below other than the 
grounds of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which Four Corners 
abandoned. 
A grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground available 
to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993), Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 
P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 1992). As discussed below, summary judgment should be 
affirmed on the grounds that Smith failed to comply with the requirements of 
the UHCMA, and that Four Corners owed no legal duty to Smith. 
Point two: Summary judgment was proper for Smith's failure to comply with 
the notice and prelitigation requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. 
By Smith's pleadings and by the evidence of the nature of the care and 
services provided by Four Corners (R. 111-112), Defendant is a "Health care 
provider" within the meaning of U.C.A. 78-14-3 (11), as amended. See also 
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661-663 (UT 1997). 
Under U.C.A. 78-14-3 (10) " 'Health care' means any act or treatment 
performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by 
14 
any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's 
medical care, treatment, or confinement." (emphasis added) Under U.C.A. 78-
14-3 (14) " 'Malpractice action against a health care provider' means any action 
against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, 
wrongful death, or otherwise, based on alleged personal injuries relating to or 
arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the 
health care provider." The specific allegations of Smith's Complaint against 
Four Corners (R. 3-4) are in the nature of a cause of action for health care 
malpractice. Accordingly, Smith must comply with the requirements of The 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, (hereinafter "UHCMA") U.C.A. 78-14-1, et 
seq. as amended. 
As Smith alleges, the assault occurred on or about June 1993. The Notice 
of Claim is dated August 12, 1994. This lawsuit was not brought until 
November 1998. The UHCMA requires that certain procedural steps be taken 
before a lawsuit can be filed against a health care provider. These include a 
notice of intent to commence an action U.C.A. 78-14-8, and prelitigation panel 
review U.C.A. 78-14-12 (2) An action cannot be brought if these prerequisites 
are not met. U.C.A. 78-14-8 and 12(l)(c). Where these prerequisites are met, 
the two year statute of limitations in U.C.A. 78-14-4 for health care 
malpractice actions applies: 
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(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be 
brought unless it is commenced within two years after plaintiff or 
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not 
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence, except that: 
(a) [exceptions for foreign object left in a patient's body] and 
(b) [exceptions for affirmative fraudulent concealment of 
misconduct] 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, 
regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-
36 or any other provision of law..." 
Smith's claims are precluded as a matter of law by Smith's failure to 
comply with the foregoing provisions of the UHCMA and summary judgment is 
proper on this basis and should be affirmed. 
Point three: Summary judgment was proper for the absence of a legal duty on 
the part of Four Comers to protect Smith from or warn him of the risk of assault 
by a third person. 
In Wilson v Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (UT 1998) a 
schizophrenic father and ex-husband had been brought to Valley Mental Health 
by the police for treatment and was released. Later the same day the man 
strangled his wife and attempted to strangle their son. The trial court granted 
Valley Mental Health's motion for summary judgment, ruling that it had no 
duty to warn or protect the victims and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the common law duty to warn of or 
protect from possible violent behavior of a mental patient. The Court noted 
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (UT 1991), in which a four-time patient at 
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the Utah State mental hospital with schizo-affective disorder escaped in a 
stolen car and caused a fatal accident while attempting to flee from the police. 
The patient had previously stabbed his roommate during a prior admission, and 
had a history of being quick to anger and two escapes. The trial court granted 
the hospital's motion for summary judgment on the basis that it owed no duty to 
Plaintiffs decedent to protect against harm caused by the patient. The Rollins 
Court affirmed and discussed Rst. 2d Torts sees. 314-320 (1965). 
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent 
him [or her] from causing physical harm to another unless: 
(a) a special relationship exists between the actor and the third 
person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's 
conduct, or 
(b) a special relationship exists between the actor and the other 
which gives to the other a right to protection." (Rst. 2d Torts section 
315) 
"One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know 
to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a 
duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him 
from doing such harm." (Rst.2d section 319) 
The Court in Rollins noted the application of these rules in the 
earlier case of Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d. 149 (UT 1989) in which a 
detainee was released from a correctional center to the weekend and 
murdered a member of the public. The Court in that case affirmed the 
trial court's summary judgment in favor of the correctional department. 
The Supreme Court in Ferree said that if the evidence had shown 
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corrections officials had reason to believe a detainee presented a danger 
to a particular third person, which was not the case, then a special relation 
and hence a duty might arise. 
The Court in Wilson concluded that the common law might impose 
a duty to warn or protect when the Defendant "should have known" of a 
danger "to a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim." The 
Court then focused on U.C.A. 78-14a-102, as amended, which defines a 
therapist's duty to warn or protect. Under this section: 
(1) A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide 
protection from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when 
that client or patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of 
physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable 
victim. That duty shall be discharges if the therapist makes reasonable 
efforts to communicate the threat to the victim, and notifies a law 
enforcement officer or agency of the threat." 
Comparing the clear and specific language of the statute to the common 
law, the Wilson Court concluded that the statute exclusively controls in cases 
involving therapists: "There is no such duty unless there is an actual threat of 
physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim 
communicated by the patient to the therapist. In cases not involving therapist, 
our case law still governs." (id. at 421 ) 
2
 The section goes on to say in subsection (3) that this protection does not limit a therapist's duty to report child 
abuse or neglect under 62A-4a-403, which requires reporting upon observing that a child has been subjected or 
is being subjected to abuse or neglect, and not to predicting that a child could be so subjected. 
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Here, Smith does not claim that Bybee communicated to Four Comers 
an actual threat to harm Smith or any other reasonably identifiable victim. 
Plaintiff merely alleges Four Comers knew or should have known that Bybee 
"possessed a violent character and had homosexual tendencies." Neither Bybee 
nor Plaintiff were in the custody or under the control of Four Comers. Under the 
above authorities, even assuming for discussion Bybee was receiving mental 
health care services from Defendant's therapists, no duty to warn or protect 
Plaintiff exists as a matter of law under the undisputed facts. 
Point four: Appellants' brief does not attempt to marshal the evidence. 
The daunting task of marshalling the evidence on appeal was explained in 
Oneida/ SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 872 P.2d 1051 
(UTApp. 1994): 
"Utah appellate courts do not take the trial courts' factual findings lightly. 
We repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear 
when challenging factual findings. To successfully appeal a trial court's 
findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
'[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and 
fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the 
[marshalling] duty..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very finding the appellant resists.' [citations omitted] 
Once appellants have established every pillar supporting their adversary's 
position, they then must 'ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence' and show 
why those pillars fail to support the trial court's findings, [citation 
omitted] They must show the trial court's findings are 'so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making 
them ' clearly erroneous.' [citation omitted]'" (id. at 1052-1053, 
emphasis original). 
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The consequence to appellants who fail properly to martial the evidence 
when required is that the appellate court will not consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and will accept them as valid, (id. at 1053). Here, 
Smith challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in his first and second issues 
on appeal, fails to marshal the evidence but has simply re-argued his case. This 
Court on appeal should therefore decline to consider the merits of any of 
Smith's challenges to the findings of fact and summarily affirm the judgment. 
Point five: Smith failed to preserve his objections to discovery responses below 
and cannot predicate error on this point. 
Smith did not bring a motion to compel, a motion under URCvP 56(f) to 
continue the hearing to allow additional discovery by Smith, or other motion to 
test the appropriateness of the objections by Four Corners to his discovery 
requests, or to allow additional discovery necessary to respond to the motion. 
Smith's assignment of error based on Four Comers' objections and refusal to 
respond to interrogatories was not properly preserved below. Ong Intl (U.S.A.), 
Inc.v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). 
Point six: The Affidavit of Tracy Morris contains inadmissible hearsay and 
unfounded opinions. The Want Ads (exhibit 2 to Appellant's brief) are 
inadmissible and are not part of the record and Smith should not be permitted to 
add evidence to the record on appeal. 
Defendant Randall's Motion to Strike portions of Tracy Morris Affidavit 
and supporting Memorandum (R. 160-164) and Four Corners' objection at oral 
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to Want Ads evidence (R. 206, pp. 21-22) timely and properly challenged the 
admissibility and timeliness of evidence offered by Smith to attempt to create 
factual disputes. The Morris Affidavit sets forth unfounded opinion about what 
Four Corners knew or should have known concerning Bybee's violent 
tendencies based on inadmissible hearsay, and legal opinions about Four 
Corners' duty to protect Smith .The Randall's Motion to strike paragraphs 2, 3, 
4, 6, 7, and 8 of the Affidavit preserved these proper objections and the 
Affidavit is inadmissible should not be considered. Norton v Blackham, 669 
P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). The Want Ads. exhibit 1 to Smith's brief, were not in 
evidence before the trial court and should not be considered for the first time on 
appeal. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 
1993). 
Conclusion and Relief Sought 
Based on the foregoing, Four Corners submits that the summary judgment 
in favor of Four Corners should be affirmed and Four Corners should be 
awarded its costs under URAppP 34(a). 
Dated this * ? J ^ day of _ ^ , 2002. 
DUNK& 
CLIFFORD C. ROSS 
Attorneys for Appellee Four Corners 
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